Insecure Deserialization in Java

Concept of Serialization

The process of converting the state of object into stream of bytes is called serialization.

The purpose of serialization is to save the object’s state to the file system or transmit it over the network for future use.

In the context of Java

• Serializable is a marker interface.
• It has no data member and method.
• It is only used to mark java classes so that objects of these type of classes may get a certain capability.

Create a User class and make it serializable.

Create an object from the User class and save it into the file system in .ser format.

Concept of Deserialization

The process of re-creating the actual object in memory from byte stream is called de-serialization.

The User class must be available in the Java classpath for deserialization to succeed.

Observations

• For instance, if a serialized object is created using the User class but type checking during deserialization is performed with the SuperUser class, then application will throw a ClassCastException.

• However, if a serialized object is created using the SuperUser class but type checking during deserialization is performed with the User class, the application will not throw any exception because SuperUser class is derived from the base class User.

• Some objects may be required to implement Serializable due to inheritance for example SuperUser. It inherites the base class User that implements Serializable.

To ensure that such objects (e.g., SuperUser) cannot be deserialized, we can override the readObject() method and mark it as final to throw an exception during the deserialization process.

The Bug

1. The readObject() method of java.io.ObjectInputStream is vulnerable.

2. During the Deserialization process, the readObject() method is always being called, and it can construct any sort of Serializable object that can be found on the Java classpath before passing it back to the caller for the type check.

3. An Exception occurs only when there’s a type mismatch between the returned object and the expected object. If the constructed object performs any harmful actions during its construction, it’s already too late to prevent them by the time type checking.

How to Identify

From a Blackbox perspective

1. Look for magic numbers like AC ED 00 05 or rO0A (base64-encoded) in the request/response to identify if the application is handling a serialized object.

2. The Content-Type header in the HTTP response is set to application/x-java-serialized-object.

⠀ From a Whitebox perspective

1. Search the codebase for Java Serialization APIs such as ObjectInputStream, particularly instances of readObject() method, and analyze how ObjectInputStream is utilized.

2. Before calling readObject(), ensure the code checks for all expected classes from the serialized object using a whitelist.

What is the Impact

1. Remote code execution through property-oriented programming or gadget chaining.

2. Bypass authorization or escalate privileges via Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) if the object’s signature / authenticity is not verified.

3. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, such as exhausting heap memory, CPU cycle.

How to Exploit

Perform Denial of Service

1. Generate a malicious serialized object using DoSExploit.java.

2. During deserialization, when the application attempts to reconstruct the object in memory, it consumes 100% of the CPU resources.

Execute Remote Code

Leveraging ysoserial

• Generate the rce payload to open gnome-calculator using the latest ysoserial.

java -jar ysoserial-all.jar CommonsCollections7 gnome-calculator > bad_serialized_object_ysoserial.ser

• The modern Java Security Manager by default includes protections against unsafe deserialization by blocking blacklisted gadgets. Therefore, disabling that feature in code by adding the following line in DemoDeserilization.java

// in current Java, by default enableUnsafeSerialization is set to 'false'
System.setProperty(
        "org.apache.commons.collections.enableUnsafeSerialization",
        "true");

During deserialization, when the application tries to reconstruct the object in memory, it launches the calculator.

Handcraft the payload

I’ve put together a detailed blog post on how to create the entire RCE gadget chain from scratch.

• Set up the exploit dev environment
  • JDK version: openjdk-23
  • Add commons-collectios-3.2.2.jar, commons-lang3-3.7.jar and mockito-all-1.9.5.jar into the Java classpath.

• Download the exploit code - RCE.java.

Java’s strong encapsulation introduced in Java 9+, which restricts reflective access to certain internal Java classes and fields by default. This is especially relevant when using libraries or tools that attempt to access private or internal fields of classes like HashMap.

• By adding the --add-opens option, we can explicitly open the necessary package (java.util) for reflection. In IntelliJ IDEA -> Run -> Edit Configurations -> In VM options field, add the following

--add-opens java.base/java.util=ALL-UNNAMED

• Execute RCE.java and generate the rce_serialized_object.

During deserialization, when the application attempts to reconstruct the object in memory, it opens the calculator.

How to Mitigate

1. Do not blindly accept serialized objects from untrusted sources. Implement integrity checks or sign the serialized objects to prevent tampering or the creation of malicious objects.

2. Use a whitelist approach to secure java.io.ObjectInputStream

   • Create a HashSet containing all expected classes wrapped in the object.
   • Extend ObjectInputStream to create a custom SafeObjectInputStream class.
   • Override the resolveClass() method to verify if cls.getName() exists in the HashSet, otherwise, throw an InvalidClassException.

When we provide any object other than User type, it throws exception.

When we provide User type object, it does not throw any exception.

A Denial of Service (DoS) is inevitable if the expected object type is a HashSet, HashMap, or ArrayList.

Defense in depth

1. Use the transient keyword for sensitive fields that you do not want to be serialized. The transient keyword prevents a variable, like a password field, from being serialized. When the JVM encounters a variable marked as transient or static, it disregards its original value and instead saves the default value corresponding to that variable’s data type.

2. For detective controls, log any exceptions or failures that occur during the deserialization process.

3. Use Java Security Manager to block specific classes such as InvokerTransformer.

// in current Java, by default enableUnsafeSerialization is set to 'false'
System.setProperty(
        "org.apache.commons.collections.enableUnsafeSerialization",
        "false");

Code Repo

https://github.com/greyshell/java_insecure_deserialization